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UNSELFISH SALVATION: 
LEVINAS, KIERKEGAARD, AND THE PLACE 
OF SELF-FULFILLMENT IN ETHICS 
Christopher Arroyo 
Levinas' ethics is often seen as implying a radical altruism, one which leaves 
no room for the subject's self-fulfillment. In fact, Levinas rejects Kierkegaard's 
ethics precisely because of the latter's concern for salvation and its seemingly 
egoistic implications. However, I argue (1) that Levinas misreads Kierkegaard 
on the issue of salvation, (2) that Kierkegaard's ethics and notion of salvation 
are non-egoistic and leave room for a notion of self-fulfillment that does not 
corrupt his selfless ethics, and (3) that Levinas, despite standard readings, cre-
ates a similar place for self-fulfillment in his description of the face to face 
encounter with th.e Other. 
All philosophy is justification of oneself. The only original philosophy would be the 
one that would justify someone else. 
Albert Camus! 
If we were to adopt Camus' criterion for an original philosophy, then it 
would seem quite appropriate to call the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas origi-
nal. For Levinas does not hesitate in criticizing the history of Western phi-
losophy for being primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the experi-
encing, knowing, and acting subject. Levinas offers a radical alternative to 
this tradition by formulating an ethics that privileges the Other over the I, 
drawing attention to the radical asymmetry that obtains between the sub-
ject and the absolutely Other. It is this grounding of morality on the 
absolutely Other, seemingly to the detriment of the subject, that makes 
Levinas' philosophy novel. 
Perhaps another candidate for the kind of originality we are attributing 
to Levinas would be the ethics Kierkegaard formulates in Works of Love.2 
Recognizing this similarity, M. Jamie Ferreira maintains that it is reasonable 
to "argue that the notion of the absolute and unconditional duty to love all 
without exception, dominating self-love's selfish preferential love (which 
we find in Kierkegaard), is parallel to the notion of absolute and uncondi-
tional and infinite demand placed on us by the very existence of the other 
(which we find in Levinas)."3 There are many striking similarities between 
the ethics found in Works of Love and the one found in Totality and Infinity; 
yet we find a significant objection to Kierkegaard's thought in the work of 
Levinas himself. At the very end of Totality and Infinity, Levinas makes one 
of the very few references to Kierkegaard in this work. He writes: 
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The I is conserved then in goodness, without its resistance to system 
manifesting itself as the egoist cry of the subjectivity, still concerned 
for happiness or salvation, as in Kierkegaard. To posit being as Desire 
is to decline at the same time the ontology of isolated subjectivity and 
the ontology of impersonal reason realizing itself in history.5 
Despite the seemingly Other-focused ethics of neighborly love found in 
Kierkegaard, Levinas takes issue with the Danish thinker's inclusion of an 
apparent concern for one's own salvation in the latter's discussion of ethics. 
This concern reveals, according to Levinas, traces of egoism in Kierkegaard's 
thought that Levinas rejects in his own account of the ethicaP 
On most readings of Totality and Infinity it appears that Levinas success-
fully purges from his account of the Ethical Relation anything remotely 
resembling what the eudaimonistic tradition has understood as happiness 
(even happiness as understood by Kantian deontology). Inasmuch as this 
is the case, there is a striking difference between Kierkegaard's ethics and 
Levinas'; one might go so far as to say that insofar as an original ethics 
should purify itself of such selfish concerns, Levinas' account proves more 
innovative. 
The aim of this paper is to reveal how Levinas, although offering a radi-
cal ethics of the Other, is not significantly different from Kierkegaard on 
the issue of "salvation," for he has created a space for happiness or fulfill-
ment as understood within the Aristotelian eudaimonistic tradition.' In 
order to do this I will first discuss Levinas' notion of egoism and its corre-
sponding notions of "freedom" as they are described in his treatment of 
Ontology and Enjoyment. I will contrast the egoism of Enjoyment with the 
selflessness of Desire as it appears in Levinas' metaphYSical relation, draw-
ing attention to how he seemingly precludes any notion of happiness from 
the Ethical. I will then move on to an examination of Kierkegaard's ethics 
in Works of Love, drawing attention to how he, too, rejects an egoistical 
ethics. Discussing the role of salvation therein, I will argue that it cannot 
be characterized as a concern for "happiness" as Levinas understands it. 
Finally, working from the understanding of salvation found in 
Kierkegaard, I shall argue that, in his account of the Ethicat Levinas does 
in fact have a space for a notion of fulfillment of the self. 
Enjoyment, Happiness, and Desire 
As mentioned above, Levinas offers us an ethics that grounds itself in the 
Other. In his effort to develop his ethics, he is diligent in avoiding what he 
terms "Egoism." Egoism, as Levinas articulates it is the subject'S exclusive 
concern with itself, which is manifested in a variety of ways throughout 
the history of philosophy. One such way is through Ontology. Ontology 
involves "a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle 
and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being."s Ontology 
reveals egoism at the level of representation or theoretical philosophy, for 
it is in my attempt to understand the world that I also seek to com-prehend 
it; that is to say, through the application of concepts I make the world my 
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own, reduce its otherness to sameness by incorporating it into my being. 
What is interesting to note is that ontology, through its reduction of the 
other to the same, "promotes freedom-freedom that is the identification 
of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other."9 "That reason 
in the last analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralizing 
the other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid 
down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing other limits 
it."IO As we shall see, this freedom is not authentic freedom, for it is 
grOlmded on a more fundamental freedom, the freedom that arises at the 
Ethical relation. Although Ontology reveals the egoism that Levinas is so 
wary of, it is not the only level at which egoism plays a dominant role. 
Egoism is perhaps most strongly characteristic of what Levinas calls 
Enjoyment, and this is where he locates the subject's search for happiness. 
Levinas provides us with a telling description of the egoism that permeates 
Enjoyment early in the text: liThe possibility of possessing, that is, of sus-
pending the very alterity of what is only at first other, an other relative to 
me, is the way of the same. I am at home with myself in the world because 
it offers itself to or resists possession." 1l In Enjoyment, I am concerned 
solely with my needs. I seek to satisfy them, and I see the world I inhabit 
and the objects it contains simply as means to this end. Levinas' preferred 
image for articulating these needs is through nourishment, for it "is the 
transmutation of the other into the same, which is the essence of enjoy-
ment: an energy that is other, recognized as other, recognized, we will see 
as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, 
my own energy, my strength, me."ll It is significant that the wants and 
desires the I seeks to satisfy in Enjoyment are primarily, if not exclusively, 
sensual, for this helps to underscore the self-centeredness of Enjoyment.13 
And the satisfaction of these wants and desires is equated with happiness. 
"Behind theory and practice there is enjoyment of theory and practice: the 
egoism of life. The final relation is enjoyment, happiness."14 
Given Levinas' characterization of Enjoyment and happiness as a con-
cern with satisfying wants and desires, it is fair to say that Levinas' notion 
of happiness is very Kantian. In fact, Levinas' definition of happiness is 
identical with Kant's. "Happiness is made up not of an absence of needs, 
whose tyranny and imposed character one denounces, but of the satisfac-
tion of all needs."ls In fact, Levinas associates happiness with what he 
terms "Need", and Need is much like Kant's understanding of sensible 
inclinations and desires. "Need indicates void and lack in the needy one, 
its dependence on the exterior, the insufficiency of the needy being precise-
ly that it does not entirely possess its being .... "16 Because happiness is the 
end that Enjoyment seeks, and because happiness is achieved only through 
the satisfaction of my needs, Enjoyment exhibits a strong tendency to ego-
ism, for I see the other exclusively as a means to my end: "Everything is 
here, everything belongs to me."17 Once again, the I seeks to reduce the 
other to the same. Yet, it is important to note that, for Levinas, myexperi-
encing enjoyment and feeling at home in the world is a step on the way to 
recognizing the Ethical. lR Yet it is still a concern primarily for myself, my 
well-being and my happiness, that constitutes Enjoyment. 
In describing Enjoyment, Levinas uses the phrase "living from .. .. fT This 
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phrase" delineates independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and 
of its happiness, which is the original pattern of all independence."lY In 
describing ontology, we noted that egoism reveals itself as the tendency to 
reduce the other to the same, and in this tendency purports to affirm free-
dom·-at least as it is understood at the level of representation. This same 
kind of affirmation of freedom takes place in Enjoyment. In living from the 
things I find in the world, in taking possession of them and using them as a 
means to my happiness, I am asserting my independence and "freedom". 
In taking possession I am "at home," yet this home "is not a container but a 
site where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is other, I am, despite 
this dependence or thanks to it, free."20 Of course, as with ontology, the free-
dom that is asserted is inauthentic inasmuch as it is grounded on a more 
fundamental freedom, that which is found in the Ethical relation. But we 
must postpone a discussion of this freedom until later. 
We have seen how Need characterizes the egoism that is present within 
Enjoyment. It is this understanding of Need that Levinas contrasts with 
Desire. In Need, the I seeks to satisfy its inclinations and wants, such as the 
need for food, drink, a home, etc. On the contrary, Desire cannot be satis-
fied, for it is a desire for something that does not indicate a drive to possess 
or reduce the Other but rather "tends towards something else entirely, 
toward the absolutely other."21 Metaphysical desire "desires beyond every-
thing that can simply complete it. It is like goodness-the Desired does not 
fulfill it, but deepens it."22 Desire is fundamentally different from the Need 
characteristic of Enjoyment and happiness: "in need I can sink my teeth into 
the real and satisfy myself in assimilating the other; in Desire there is no 
sinking one's teeth into being, no satiety, but an uncharted future before 
me."23 Desire is radically different from Need because it is completely self-
less, concerned exclusively with the Other. It is not a craving for sensual 
satisfaction but is a "Desire for the Infinite which the desirable arouses 
rather than satisfies. A Desire perfectly disinterested-goodness."24 
Given these descriptions of the Desire one has for the Other, it comes as 
no surprise when we find Levinas asserting that this Desire "is absolutely 
non-egoist."25 And here is where we see how there can be no place for hap-
piness at the level of the Ethical relation, at least insofar as Levinas has 
defined happiness. For happiness, because of its essential connection with 
Need, necessarily involves egoism and the drive to possess the other in 
order to use the other as a means to satisfying my egoistical drives. 
Levinas sees such egoism inherent in the self's "concern" for salvation as 
described by Kierkegaard. Yet one may ask whether Kierkegaard's "pre-
occupation with salvation" is justly characterized as a concern for happi-
ness-as Levinas understands it. Furthermore, one may inquire as to 
whether there is a space within the Ethical for the kind of fulfillment or 
"happiness" that is more characteristic of the eudaimonistic tradition. And 
in order to answer both questions we must turn to an examination of 
Kierkegaard's ethics in Works oj Love in order to draw out its similarities 
with Levinas' ethics, so that we may investigate into the nature of 
Kierkegaard's concern for salvation. 
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Kierkegaard's Ethics of Neighborly Love 
Perhaps in examining Kierkegaard's ethics in Works of Love it would be best 
to begin where he does, namely with the opening prayer. We find at the end 
of the prayer a succinct characterization of an authentic work of love: "[B]ut 
in heaven no work can be pleasing unless it is a work of love: sincere in self-
renunciation, a need in love itself, and for that very reason without any claim 
of meritoriousness!"26 Even in this short passage we can see strong similari-
ties with Levinas. First of all, it is important to note that Kierkegaard rejects 
an ethics concerned with improper self-love (i.e., EgOism), as does Levinas. 
His next statement regarding the need of love may seem to belie this self-
renunciation, but, as we will see, this need should be understood more akin 
to Levinas' Desire rather than his notion of Need.27 Finally, In opposition to 
the reading Levinas gives him, Kierkegaard insists that a true work of love 
makes no claim to meritoriousness. 
If Levinas is highly critical of the egoism that pervades Enjoyment, then 
Kierkegaard is just as critical of the self-love that infects what he calls pref-
erential love, namely erotic love and friendship. Kierkegaard calls these 
two kinds of love preferential because each "has preference's name, 'the 
beloved/ 'the friend/ who is loved in contrast to the whole world."28 It is 
because the beloved is different in certain respects from other persons that 
she is loved. "Just as self-love selfishly embraces this one and only self that 
makes it self-love, so also erotic love's passionate preference selfishly encir-
cles this one and only beloved, and friendship's passionate preference 
encircles this one and only friend."29 
But the problem with preferential love is deeper than this, for preferen-
tial or celebrated love is motivated by self-love. Celebrated love is driven 
by a one's needs and inclinations, by the need to be loved in return by the 
beloved, and it is under the guise of "altruistic" erotic or philial love that 
the self pursues these needs and inclinations. "In the beloved and the 
friend, it of course is not the neighbor who is loved, but the other I, or the 
first lance again, but more intensely."30 Although Kierkegaard does not 
speak of self-love in terms of the satisfaction of basic needs, as Levinas 
does, there is fundamental agreement between the two thinkers on this 
issue. For Kierkegaard, the self seeks to possess the beloved for himself, 
and in this way, his account of self-love is analogous to Egoism as dis-
cussed in Levinas. Where a difference between the two thinkers begins to 
emerge is in Kierkegaard's remedy for this self-love, for the commandment 
is not merely to love the neighbor but to "love the neighbor as yourself." 
Here is a point where Levinas would take issue with Kierkegaard's ethics, 
for it appears that it is still infected with Egoism insofar as love for the 
neighbor is connected with love of the self, despite Kierkegaard's insis-
tence that it be "proper" self-love. 
In his own defense, Kierkegaard is quick to qualify what is meant by "as 
yourself." "Christianity presupposes that a person loves himself and then 
adds to this only the phrase about the neighbor as yourself. And yet there is 
a change of eternity between the former and the latter."3! The "self-love" 
involved with the commandment to love the neighbor as oneself is radical-
ly different from the self-love one finds in celebrated or preferential love. 
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In fact, it is a misrepresentation to call this "loving as oneself" self-love. 
"[I]f one is to love he neighbor as oneself, then the commandment, as with a 
pick, wrenches open the lock of self-love and wrests it away from a per-
son."32 In fact, Kierkegaard describes the Christian commandment to love 
the neighbor as oneself as an exercise in "self-denial, which is Christianity's 
essential form."33 This self-denial, which is essential to the Christian call to 
love, is what precludes loving oneself from being infected by improper 
self-love. It is not the case that in loving the neighbor as myself I merely 
think of the ways in which I need to be loved and then simply love the 
neighbor in these ways; rather, there is a "change of eternity" between the 
self-love of preferential love and this notion of loving as oneself. 
Yet there remains a passage in Kierkegaard that would lead one to 
believe that although he seeks to purge his ethics of any self-love or egoism 
he does not truly respect the alterity of the neighbor, for the neighbor is 
understood in terms of the self. "The concept of the 'neighbor' is actually 
the redoubling of your own self; 'the neighbor is what thinkers call 'the 
other,' that by which the selfishness in self-love is to be tested."'" It would 
be very easy to read this passage as indicative of Kierkegaard falling into 
the tendency to reduce the other to the same. Yet, given his categorical 
rejection of self-love, it would be more consistent with the ethics outlined 
thus far to read him as merely emphasizing in a slightly different way 
what he has already said about loving the neighbor as oneself-a loving, 
which I have argued, is in fact not egoistic.35 This point is brought to light 
further in the text where Kierkegaard writes, "Whether we speak of the 
first lor of the other I, we do not come a step closer to the neighbor, because 
the neighbor is the first you."" 
Still, the question arises as to what is meant by this" change of eternity" 
Kierkegaard speaks of, for it is this difference that purports to purge self-
love/egoism from the love of the neighbor. Here we arrive at the most 
striking difference between Kierkegaard and Levinas. As is well known, 
Levinas articulates an ethics of the absolutely Other, an Other that is my 
human other, my neighbor. Kierkegaard offers an ethics that is grounded 
on the absolutely Other as well, yet his absolutely Other is not my human 
neighbor but God.37 God stands as the "middle term" between the neigh-
bor and myself, making the difference of eternity. The essential role of 
God in loving the neighbor is brought to light by Kierkegaard in the fol-
lowing passage: 
Worldly wisdom is of the opinion that love is a relationship between persons; 
Christianity teaches that love is relationship between; a person-God-a 
person, that is, that God is the middle term. However beautiful a rela-
tionship of love has been between two people or among many, how-
ever complete all their desire and all their bliss have been for them-
selves in mutual sacrifice and devotion, even though everyone has 
praised this relationship-if God and the relationship with God have 
been omitted, then this, in the Christian sense, has not been love but a 
mutually enchanting defraudation of 10ve.38 
It is only in relating to the neighbor through God that one may achieve an 
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authentic work of love.39 God stands as this middle term because God is 
the "God of love, source of all love in heaven and on earth ... you who are 
love, so that one who loves is what he is only by being in yoU."40 
Of course, we must now ask what this relationship with God consists of, 
and with this question we may now turn to the charge Levinas makes 
against Kierkegaard regarding the latter's concern for personal salvation. 
From what we have seen thus far, it would appear that this charge would, 
in the very least, be in tension with the selfless ethic Kierkegaard presents 
us with. But one sees a potential ground for Levinas' critique in 
Kierkegaard's elaboration on the self's relationship with God and his dis-
cussion of hope. Kierkegaard, in the third chapter of the Second Series of 
Works of Love, asserts that love hopes all things. He goes on to describe this 
notion of hope as relating "to the future, to possibility ... the possibility of 
advance or retrogression, of rising or falling, of good or of evil."41 To be 
sure, this hope is in one sense directed toward the neighbor, concerned 
with her goodness. But Kierkegaard also says, "Christianity's hope is eter-
nity, and Christ is the Way; his debasement is the Way, but he was also the 
Way when he ascended into heaven."42 Here, then, we see why Levinas 
thinks that Kierkegaard is ultimately concerned with salvation; for in love's 
hope it appears that the self loves in order to achieve eternal salvation in 
union with God. 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard discusses this notion of hope in relation to 
despair. For him, "despair is the lack of the eternal."43 So it would seem 
that only in obeying God's commandment to love the neighbor, only in 
relating to (i.e., loving) God in "the right way" can the self secure itself 
against despair. Hence, it appears that Kierkegaard implicitly introduces 
into his ethics an egoistic motive on the part of the self in obeying God's 
commandment. However, Kierkegaard goes on to characterize despair, 
not as a lack of "happiness" (as Levinas understands it) in the subject, but 
as "a misrelation in a person's innermost being ... For this reason there is 
only one security against despair: to undergo the change of eternity 
through duty's shall."44 Of course, one could read this statement as assert-
ing the kind of egoism that Levinas sees in Kierkegaard's ethics. But as I 
stated above, to quickly dismiss Kierkegaard's discussion of hope and 
despair as a reversion to egoism would be to grossly ignore the detailed 
arguments he gives against love that is motivated by self-love. 
So how should one read Kierkegaard's discussion of hope? It should be 
dear from the discussion above that, like Levinas, Kierkegaard argues for 
an essentially relational self, not the autonomous self that is so distinctive 
of classical modern philosophy; this is apparent in his description of 
despair as a "misrelation." Moreover, we must remember that thus far 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the divine command to love the neighbor 
is not motivated by self-love but arises from a proper relation to God that 
leads us to selflessly obey God's command. "Yet only in self-denial can 
one effectually praise love, because God is love, and only in self-denial can 
one hold fast to God .. .in self-denial he must become (since self-denial is 
related to the universally human and thus is distinguished from the partic-
ular call and election), an instrument for God."45 Therefore, when 
Kierkegaard speaks of the hope of the lover for the eternal and the eternal 
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as correcting this misrelation within the self, this should not be seen as the 
motivation for the self's actions but rather as an unintended consequence to 
participating in an authentic love relationship with God and the neighbor. 
The lover does not love the neighbor and God in order}o receive eternal sal-
vation or right relation within himself; rather, this right relation, this 
authentic selfhood, comes about as a "side effect," for lack of a better 
term:" Of course, this "side effect" does indeed have consequences for the 
self, for it is now in right relation to God, neighbor, and itself, and, there-
fore, is authentic, but in no way does the self in his obeying the command-
ment pursue this "right relation". 
This reading of the role of hope and salvation in Kierkegaard's ethics is 
further supported by his repeated emphasis that the command to love 
must not be obeyed out of requirement for reward-it must be self-sacrific-
ing." Kierkegaard considers the possibility of requiring a reward from the 
beloved neighbor, even a reward that is love in return. No such reward 
may be expected:" He asserts that commanded love "belongs entirely to 
God, or in it the person belongs entirely to God," yet, 
There is only one who sees the true connectedness, and he does not 
admire, since God in heaven does not admire any human being. On 
the contrary, while the true sacrifice has only one single abode-
God-it nevertheless in tum seems to be forsaken by God, because it 
understands that before God it has no merit at all ... .'9 
So it is not the case that by obeying the command to love that one impress-
es God and therefore merits salvation. If the self does in fact receive salva-
tion, if it does gain right relation within itself because of its relation to the 
eternal, this is not because it is concerned with its own "happiness" or 
eudaimonia but rather because right relation with God is the sole intended 
effect on the part of the self in its effort to selflessly obey God's command.5O 
It is with this understanding of the non-egoistical role of salvation in 
Kierkegaard's ethics that we can now return to Levinas and inquire as to 
whether his ethics contains a space for such a conception of "salvation." 
Conclusion: Levinas' Face to Face and the Other as "Savior" 
We have seen how Levinas, in formulating his ethics of the Other, has 
repeatedly insisted on the radically selfless position the subject must take 
towards the Other. I have sought to draw attention to this through a dis-
cussion of Levinas' critique of egoism. One thing which has been empha-
sized throughout this discussion, both in the Egoism that reveals itself in 
Ontology's drive to reduce the Other to the same and the Egoism that 
seeks to possess the Other in an effort to use the Other as a means to its 
happiness, is the self's repeated attempts to promote or assert its freedom. 
Yet freedom as it is asserted in Ontology and Enjoyment is not authentic 
freedom, for these kinds of freedom are grounded on a more fundamental 
freedom, the freedom which arises in the Ethical relation. It is in his dis-
cussion of this fundamental freedom, which grounds all freedom, that 
Levinas reveals a space within his ethics for a notion of fulfillment or salva-
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tion as I have argued appears in Kierkegaard's ethics. 
It would seem that the relationship Levinas presents us with in his 
description of metaphysical Desire would not only preclude Egoism or a 
concern with oneself but also lead to an oppression of the self in its recog-
nition of its obligation to the Other. That is to say, it appears that in 
acknowledging its debt to the Other, the self not only renounces its own 
claim to freedom (the freedom that occurs in Representation or Enjoyment) 
but also is oppressed by the Other.51 Yet we find Levinas asserting at the 
beginning of Totality and Infinity that "This book then does present itself as 
a defense of subjectivity, but it will apprehend this subjectivity ... as founded 
in the idea of infinity."52 So how does Levinas reconcile this seemingly 
oppressive encounter with the Other and his assertion that he is defending 
subjectivity? He is sensitive to this issue and addresses it in the chapter 
titled, "Ethics and the Face." He reassures us that the Other "does not 
purely and simply negate the I."51 Moreover, he continues, "The resistance 
of the other does not do violence to me, does not act negatively; it has a 
positive structure: ethical.. .. I do not struggle with a faceless God but I 
respond to his expression, to his revelation."54 It is in this positive ethical 
relation that Levinas reveals the place for the self's fulfillment in his ethics. 
It is the Ethical relation that grounds the freedom of the I, but not 
because it is within this relation that the autonomous I truly asserts its free-
dom; rather, freedom is grounded in the Ethical because it is only in the 
face to face encounter that I receive my freedom. "But the absolutely 
other-the Other-does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to 
responsibility, it founds it and justifies it. The relation with the other as 
face heals allergy."ss Levinas also says that "in expression the being that 
imposes itself does not limit but promotes my freedom, by arousing my 
goodness. The order of responsibility, where the gravity of ineluctable 
being freezes all laughter, is also the order where freedom is ineluctably 
invoked."56 
Here we see that despite Levinas' insistence on the non-egoistic nature 
of Desire and the selflessness that characterizes the Ethical relation, the self 
does in fact receive from the Other the very freedom it has sought to pro-
mote throughout Levinas' analysis. Might one not say that within 
Ontology and Enjoyment, insofar as these are seen as being the ultimate 
grounds of freedom, the self is in a "fundamental misrelation"? Is it not 
the case that in opening up to and entering into the right relation with the 
infinite Other (the eternal for Kierkegaard), this misrelation is corrected? 
And, in this sense, could not one describe the self as receiving "salvation" 
from the Other, achieving a fulfillment that does not qualify as sensual 
happiness yet nevertheless brings the self out of "despair" into right rela-
tion with the Other, thereby fulfilling the self? 
It is not surprising that Levinas avoids this kind of language in dis-
cussing the founding of the self's freedom in the absolutely Other, for his 
writings are an attempt to overcome the egoism that has infected Western 
philosophy. Yet given the role salvation plays in Kierkegaard, namely not 
one of sensual self-satisfaction but one of unintended self-fulfillment, it 
seems that in designating the Other as the giver of my freedom Levinas has 
created a space for a fulfillment of the self, a kind of "happiness". And we 
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can, therefore, see that despite the initial appearance of stark dissimilarity 
on this issue, both Kierkegaard and Levinas are more in agreement than 
their readers have been led to believe.57 
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